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United States businesses have made a wide variety of questionable
foreign payments.' The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 2 makes
certain bribery of foreign officials a criminal offense, but many ques-
tionable payments are not covered by the new statutea and thus are not
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1. "Questionable foreign payments" are payments in connection with foreign transac-
tions that may have been made to an official, employee, agency, or instrumentality of a
foreign government and thus may be nondeductible under § 162(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code.
For recent discussions of the nature and extent of questionable foreign payments, see
N. JACOBY, P. NEHEMKIS & R. EELLS, BRIBERY AND EXTORTION IN WORLD BUSINESS (1977);
2 G. MYRDAL, ASIAN DRAMA 937-58 (1968); SEC Report on Questionable and Illegal
Corporate Payments and Practices, CCH FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW REPORTS No. 642, pt. II
(May 19, 1976) [hereinafter cited as SEC Report]; Hearings on Political Contributions to
Foreign Governments Before the Subcomin. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate
Comm. onl Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); The Activities of American
Multinational Corporations Abroad: Hearings Before the Subcontin. oil International
Economic Policy of the House Comm. on International Relations, 9th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494. For discussions of criminal sanctions for question-
able foreign payments, see N. JACOBY, P. NENIEMKIS & R. EELLS, supra note 1, at 215-20;
Note, Prohibiting Foreign Bribes: Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Payments Abroad, 10
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 231 (1977).
The United States has also considered controlling payments to foreign officials by in-
ternational agreements. See, e.g., N. JACOBY, P. NEHEMKIs & R. EELLS, supra note 1, at
217 ("mutual cooperation pact" between Department of Justice and 10 nations for ex-
change of information on questionable payments by United States companies); 74 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 121-23 (1976).
3. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, applies
only to bribery that involves use of the mails or other means or instrumentalities of in-
terstate commerce. Id. §§ 103(a), 104(a), 91 Stat. 1495, 1496 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78dd-l, 78ff). (Note, however, that the use of the mails or other means of interstate
commerce need only be in furtherance of otherwise prohibited acts. H. CONF. REP. No.
831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977) [hereinafter cited as H. CONF. REP. No. 95-831].) Certain
bribes, especially those in which the decisionmnaking occurs entirely outside the United
States, can be engineered to avoid the use of interstate commerce. In addition, the Act
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directly proscribed by United States law .4 Whether or not questionable
payments are illegal, however, they are subject to scrutiny under the
does not apply to payments made by foreign subsidiaries of United States corporations,
though any person or entity covered by the Act who engaged in prohibited bribery in-
directly via any other person or entity would be liable under the Act. Id. at 14. Many
questionable payments are made by foreign subsidiaries.
Further, the Act contains three conditions that remove payments otherwise considered
bribes from the scope of the Act. First, the Act does not apply to payments made to a
foreign official (i.e., "any officer or employee of a foreign government or any depart-
ment, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official capacity for
or on behalf of such government or department, agency, or instrumentality," Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 103(a), 104(d), 91 Stat. 1496, 1498
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2)) "whose duties are essentially ministerial
or clerical." Id. The House Report (the language was not in the Senate bill) ties this
exception to the requirement of a "corrupt" purpose and indicates that the exception is
intended to allow "facilitating" or "grease" payments to be made without fear of criminal
liability, H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
No. 95-640; see 123 CONG. Rrc. HI,933 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1977) (Rep. Eckhardt). But the
language is much broader than that and arguably includes, for example, bribes to
customs officials to obtain lower-than-normal duties (which occur frequently and which
can involve significant payments to officials and savings to importers or exporters) and
bribes to license-granting authorities to obtain import or export licenses or industrial
property protection that is not allowed by law (which also occur with some regularity).
(The terms "facilitating" and "grease" payments are not defined in the Act.)
Second, the Act requires "corrupt" intent. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-213 §§ 103(a), 104(a), 91 Stat. 1495, 1496 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l,
78dd-2); 123 CONG. REC. HI1,933 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1977) (Rep. Eckhardt); S. REP. No. 114,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 95-114]. The Senate Report
states that corrupt intent connotes "an evil motive or purpose, an intent to wrongfully
influence the recipient," id., and that "true extortion situations" (such as paying "an
official to keep an oil rig from being dynamited") would not be covered because of the
lack of "the requisite corrupt purpose." Id. at 11. The House Report is less explicit,
although it does refer to the domestic bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1970), H.R.
REP. No. 95-640, supra at 8, under which extortion is a complete defense if it is based on
a threat of serious bodily harm, or evidence of a lack of the requisite corrupt intent if it
is based on a threat of only economic harm. United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395, 401-02
(2d Cir. 1966); see United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 278 (2d Cir. 1973). The Minority
Views attached to the House Report state: "It is our understanding that the bill is not
intended to reach . . . payments made under duress to protect a business investment."
H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supra at 19 n.l. The House Conference Report is silent on the
meaning of "corrupt," see H. CONF. REP. No. 95-831, supra. Thus the exact scope of this
term is uncertain. There is a strong argument, however, that at least extortion payments
fitting the oil rig example in the Senate Report will be outside the Act. Depending on
whether that example is interpreted to include a threat of damage to physical property
or of more general potential economic loss, a great many questionable foreign payments
could be excluded from the Act because of this requirement.
Third, the Act covers bribes to a foreign official made only to "assist . . . in obtaining
or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person." Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 103(a), 104(a), 91 Stat. 1495-97 (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l, 78dd-2); see H. CONF. RieP. No. 95-831, supra at 11-12. The Senate
(the House bill did not have this language, id. at 12) indicated that this was meant to
exclude "grease" payments, S. REP. No. 95-11-4, supra at 10, but does not limit its effect to
excluding such payments. Since clearly reprehensible bribes (e.g., to obtain a favorable tax
ruling) do not seem to fall within these categories, a significant number of questionable
foreign payments may be outside the Act because of this language.
4. The antitrust laws probably do not apply to questionable foreign payments. See
generally McManis, Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad: An Antitrust Approach, 86
YALE L.J. 215 (1976).
1092
Questionable Foreign Payments
accounting and disclosure requirements of the securities laws5 and cer-
tain other statutes0 and under the provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code for deducting business expenses,7 determining the earnings and
profits of foreign corporations, s and computing income of United States
shareholders from controlled foreign corporations9 and Domestic In-
ternational Sales Corporations.'"
The most important of these tax provisions is section 162(c), which
denies deductibility as a business expense" for a payment made to a
foreign official if "the payment would be unlawful under the laws of
the United States if such laws were applicable to such payment and to
such official or employee."' 2 This article analyzes the application of
5. See Lowenfels, Questionable Corporate Payments and the Federal Securities Laws,
51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1 (1976); Comment, Payments to Foreign Officials by Multinational
Corporations: Bribery or Business Expense and the Effects of United States Policy, 6 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 360 (1976); Note, Disclosure of Payments to Foreign Government Officials
Under the Securities Acts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1848 (1976). The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1977 amends § 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(b)
(1970), to require certain accounting practices designed to prevent the use of off-book
"slush funds" and the concealed payment of bribes. Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 102, 91 Stat.
1494 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m).
6. The Foreign Assistance Act requires firms conducting business under its auspices to
report all commissions paid in connection with such business to the Agency for Interna-
tional Development (AID). 29 C.F.R. § 201(k) (1977). Concealing an improper payment on
an AID form violates 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970), which makes it unlawful to conceal informa-
tion on any matter within the jurisdiction of any United States department or agency.
United States v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 368 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1966). Similarly, firms
financing purchases through the Export-Import Bank must report to that bank all com-
missions included in the contract price. 12 C.F.R. § 401.3(c) (1977). Finally, the Interna-
tional Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, which governs all foreign sales
of United States military goods, authorizes the Secretary of State to require that fees,
political contributions, and gifts made in connection with arms sales be reported to
various governmental bodies. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2779(a) (West Supp. 1977).
7. I.R.C. §§ 162(a), (c).
8. I.R.C. § 964(a).
9. I.R.C. § 952(a).
10. I.R.C. § 995(b)(1)(D).
11. I.R.C. § 162(a) allows the deduction of "all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business."
12. I.R.C. § 162(c) provides:
(1) Illegal payments to government officials or cmployces.-No deduction shall be
allowed tinder subsection (a) for any payment made, directly or indirectly, to an
official or employee of any government, or of any agency or instrumentality of any
government, if the payment constitutes an illegal bribe or kickback or, if the payment
is to an official or employee of a foreign government, the payment would be unlawful
under the laws of the United States if such laws were applicable to such payment and
to such official or employee. The burden of proof in respect of the issue, for the
purposes of this paragraph, as to whether a payment constitutes an illegal bribe or
kickback (or would be unlawful under the laws of the United States) shall be upon
the Secretary to the same extent as he bears the burden of proof under section 7454
(concerning the burden of proof when the issue relates to fraud).
(2) Other illegal payments.-No deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for
any payment (other than a payment described in paragraph (1)) made, directly or
indirectly, to any person, if the payment constitutes an illegal bribe, illegal kick-
back, or other illegal payment under any law of the United States, or under any law
of a State (but only if such State law is generally enforced), which subjects the payor
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section 162(c) through a set of hypothetical business transactions. Be-
fore turning to these transactions, it is useful to summarize the policies
on which section 162(c) rests.
to a criminal penalty or the loss of license or prihilege to engage in a trade or
business. For purposes of this paragraph, a kickback includes a pa)ment in con-
sideration of the referral of a client, patient, or customer. The burden of proof in
respect of the issue, for purposes of this paragraph, as to whether a pa)ment con-
stitutes an illegal bribe, illegal kickback, or other illegal payment shall be upon the
Secretary to the same extent as he bears the burden of proof tinder section 7454 (con-
cerning the burden of proof when the issue relates to fraud).
Before 1958 the deductibility of questionable payments to foreign officials was governed
by the public policy doctrine. Under this nonstatutory doctrine, the Commissioner denied
deductibility as business expenses to some expenditures that were otherwise ordinary and
necessary within the meaning of § 162(a) but that violated a federal or state law or were
incidental to such violation. The test of deductibility was how severely and immediately
national or state policies would be frustrated if the deduction were allowed. Tank Truck
Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 34-36 (1958). Under the public policy doctrine
the Commissioner generally disallowed bribes to foreign officials, but not without a
significant exception:
Where . . . it is the foreign government itself which demands or acquiesces in
the payment, so that legal recourse is not available to the taxpayer in the operation
of his legal business, the Service would find it difficult to sustain the position that
the expenses were not ordinary and necessary to the taxpayer's business.
Letter from Commissioner Harrington to Senator Williams, March 11, 1957, reprinted in
103 CONG. REC. 12418 (1957) (Sen. Williams). This exception did not apply, however, if
the Commissioner concluded that the payment actually violated a state or federal law. Id.
In 1958, Senator Williams introduced a bill designed explicitly to deny deductibility for
certain questionable foreign payments. 104 CONG. Rrc. 2028-29 (1958). The bill denied
deductibility for payments to foreign government officials if the receipt of the payment
would have been unlawful had United States law been applicable; it is now codified in
the first sentence of § 162(c)(1). There is little evidence of the congressional intent under-
lying the foreign payments provision of § 162(c)(1). When introducing the bill, Senator
Williams said that the public policy doctrine had been interpreted to permit deducti-
bility for the payments he had in mind. 104 CoxG. REc. 2028-29 (1958). He emphasized
that he thought bribes and kickbacks were "wrong," id. at 2028, and that American foreign
policy would be adversely affected if the United States were on record as "recognizing ...
the legitimacy or the propriety of an American corporation or individual bribing an
official or employee of a foreign government." Id. at 2029. Finally, he noted the dif-
ficulty of proving that bribes had or had not been made. Id. The Senate report on the
bill reflects only the first of these concerns: in its only explanation of why foreign bribes
should not be deductible, the report states: "because the payment of similar kickbacks or
bribes to a Federal official or employee would be unlawful." S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 125 (1958) [hereinafter cited as S. REt'. No. 85-1983].
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 reduced, in the amount of § 162(c)(1) payments, the
availability of certain tax incentives relating to foreign income. First, American companies
are ordinarily allowed to defer earnings of controlled foreign subsidiaries, I.R.C. § 995(a);
the 1976 Act subjects to current taxation as a deemed dividend an amount equal to any
§ 162(c)(1) payment by a foreign subsidiary, I.R.C. § 952(a). Second, Domestic Interna-
tional Sales Companies (DISCs) are ordinarily allowed to defer earnings, I.R.C. § 995(b)(1)
(D); the 1976 Act subjects to current taxation as a deemed dividend an amount equal to
any § 162(c)(1) payment by a DISC, id. In addition, the 1976 Act does not allow the earn-
ings and profits of foreign corporations to be reduced by the amount of § 162(c)(1) pay-
ments. I.R.C. § 9&4(a).
The legislative history of these provisions suggests only that Congress thought that it was
wrong for taxpayers to receive tax benefits or incentives for engaging in morally un-
desirable behavior: "The committee does not believe that multinational corporations
should benefit from tax incentives when they engage in misconduct." S. REP'. No. 938, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 94-938].
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I. Policies Underlying Nondeductibility of Foreign
Bribes and Similar Payments
Three policies underlie the nondeductibility of foreign bribes and
similar payments: such payments are morally wrong; they adversely
affect American foreign policy; and they result in unfair competition
and possible misallocation of resources.
The view that bribes and similar payments are morally wrong has
been basic to the various efforts to prohibit or discourage them.' 3 Dis-
couraging immoral conduct through the tax system, however, may con-
flict with that system's function of raising revenue by taxing net in-
come.' 4 These competing policies-discouraging immoral conduct and
taxing net income-suggest not that questionable payments should
automatically be nondeductible, but rather that the more reprehensible
a payment, the less likely it will be deductible.
The second reason for the nondeductibility of foreign bribes and
similar payments is that they adversely affect American foreign policy.' 5
American businesses are often identified abroad with the United States
government, so that misbehavior by one tarnishes the other.' 0 Foreign
governments may be embarrassed by revelations of bribes, and their
affiliation with the United States may be weakened if the corrupting
influence was from the United States.' 7 Bribery undermines our ob-
jective of promoting "democratically accountable governments and
professionalized civil services in developing countries" and the free
enterprise system in general.'8 Moreover, recognizing such payments
as ordinary and necessary business expenses would lend them an air of
legitimacy, since it would appear to reflect at least tacit approval by the
United States government. By denying deductibility and thus avoiding
the appearance that the United States approves such payments, damage
13. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supra note 3, at 4; S. RaP. No. 94-938, supra note
12, at 12; 104 CONG. REC. 2028-29 (1958) (Sen. Williams), See also note 12 supra.
14. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966); Taggart, Fines, Penalties,
Bribes, and Damage Payments and Recoveries, 25 TAx L. REV. 611, 614-15 (1970).
15. See H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supra note 3, at 5 (bribes create "severe" foreign policy
problems); S. REP. No. 95-114, supra note 3, at 3 ("severe adverse effects"); 104 CONG.
REe. 2028-29 (1958) (Sen. Williams); cf. S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1976)
(bribery increases likelihood of hostile popular reaction to United States) [hereinafter
cited as S. REP. No. 94-1031]. This report accompanied S. 3664, which was passed unani-
mously by the Senate on Sept. 15, 1976, 122 CONC. REC. S15862 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1976),
and which was very similar to the foreign payments bill (S. 305) passed by the Senate
in 1977. There are some differences between S. REP. No. 94-1031 and S. RaP. No. 95-114,
supra note 3, which accomplanied S. 305; we note these differences when relevant.
16. See S. REP. No. 95-114, supra note 3, at 3.
17. H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supra note 3, at 5.
18. S. REP. No. 94-1031, supra note 15, at 3-4; see H.R. Rae. No. 95-640, supra note 3,
at 4.
1095
The Yale Law Journal
to our foreign policy would be mitigated.'9 This policy indicates that
the more a payment threatens to interfere with United States foreign
policy, the less likely it will be deductible.
Finally, bribes may result in unfair competition and misallocation of
resources by allowing less efficient firms to obtain business or by en-
couraging firms to compete in the size of their bribes, rather than in
the quality or cost of their products or services.20 Although the most
efficient business may be able to pay the highest bribes, this may not
occur in practice due to imperfect information about bribes paid by
competitors. Moreover, even if the most efficient business pays the
highest bribe, it may not be awarded the contract if it bribed the
wrong person. Allowing deductions to bribes would exacerbate the
unfair competition because the real cost of a bribe to the payor would
be decreased and bribes would then probably become larger and more
frequent.21
On the other hand, discouraging bribery through the tax system
creates a form of unfair competition between United States companies
and foreign companies not subject to a provision like section 162(c).
Thus the Commissioner may be more likely to allow a deduction if the
taxpayer can show that competing businesses made similar payments in
connection with the same transaction, that no unusual service or ad-
vantage was gained as a result of the payment, that the size of the pay-
ment suggests an insignificant misallocation of resources, or that the
19. It could be argued that, in denying deductibility for bribes, the United States would
be viewed as intruding into the internal affairs of other countries. See SEC Report, supra
note 1, at 61-62. Since most countries have laws prohibiting bribery, see Note, supra note
2, at 235 n.26, and would probably acknowledge that bribery is wrong, and since denying
deductibility involves less intrusion than, for example, criminal penalties for bribes, this
risk seems slight.
20. See H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supra note 3, at 4-5; S. REP. No. 95-114, supra note 3, at
4; Note, supra note 2, at 232.
Related to this consideration is the fact that a bribe is a transfer payment. In a
bidding situation in which price is the only factor officially to be considered, the pay-
ment is transferred from the bidder to the recipient government official. In the more
usual bidding situation, in which factors in addition to price are officially to be taken
into account, or in which the bidding company includes the cost of the bribe in its
initial bid, the payment is a transfer from the government to the recipient official. Be-
cause the official is presumably less likely than the go, eminent to in'mest in publicly
oriented projects, the results of such a transfer are undesirable in the sense that the
official's investments are less directed toward the public welfare.
21. See H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supra note 3, at 5; Note, supra note 2, at 251. So far as
demand for payments is concerned, it can be argued that foreign officials attempting to
extort payments will not be significantly deterred by sanctions that cannot affect them.
See Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearings Before the Subcomn. oil Consiner Protection
and Finance of the House Comm. onl Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 109 (1976) (statement of J.T. Smith, General Counsel, Dep't of Commerce).
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payment is an accepted practice in the business community and in the
view of the foreign government.2 2
II. The Deductibility of Bribes, Kickbacks, and Extortion Payments
In order to assess the application of section 162(c) to different types
of questionable foreign payments, we consider a hypothetical multi-
national corporation, Octopus, Inc., which has made a number of ques-
tionable foreign payments and now seeks to deduct them from income.
Three payments in particular give rise to problems for the filing of
Octopus's tax returns for the current year. These payments differ in
certain respects, and, for the sake of convenience, we have labeled the
first payment a bribe, the second a kickback, and the third an extortion
payment.
The possible bribe arose when Octopus was one of several corpora-
tions to submit sealed bids for a contract to build a factory for the
Ministry of Commerce of the Republic of Homos. After Octopus had
submitted its bid, it was approached by a private sales agent known for
22. Three other reasons have been given for the nondeductibility of bribes, but none
is persuasihe. The first is the argument of Representative Nix that nondeductibility of
foreign bribes is necessary to a~oid unequal treatment of domestic companies, which must
comply with United States antibribery laws and which cannot deduct payments that
Niolate those laws, and foreign-operating companies, which would otherwise be able to
deduct bribes paid abroad. Statement of Representative Nix, July 17, 1975 (on file with
Yale Law Journal). But domestic and foreign-operating companies are not similarly situated
except in the domestic market, where both must follow American antibribery laws. In
foreign markets, the two sets of businesses are not in competition. Although the relative
success of domestic and foreign-operating companies does affect their ability to attract
investment capital, the effect of deductibility for bribes would probably be very small.
Moreover, if equity is the goal, it should be remembered that foreign-operating companies
are treated unequally vis-a-vis domestic companies because they are subject to the laws
both of the United States and of the country in which they operate and that they may be
treated unequally vis-t-vis their non-United States foreign competitors because the latter
may not be subject to a provision like § 162(c).
A second reason given for the nondeductibility of bribes is that they are difficult to
substantiate because records of bribes are likely to be meager. See, e.g., 104 CoNe. REC.
2028-29 (1958) (Sen. Williams). But this problem could better be solved directly via I.R.C.
§ 274(d), which requires adequate substantiation for deductions, or by the method used in
deductions of "payola": the deduction is disallowed unless the taxpayer furnishes the
Commissioner with the names and addresses of the recipients of the payments. 4A J.
MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.131, at 586 (1972 ed.). Such an approach
might also discourage bribes from the recipients' perspective and would, at the very least,
facilitate full taxation of the recipients (although tax revenues from recipients would
probably not go to the United States treasury).
Third, it is occasionally argued that the general business reputation of United States
firms is damaged by bribes and that this has effects such as harming the United States
balance of pa)mnents position. See, e.g., Note, supra note 2, at 232. Although it may be
that bribes do harm the general reputation of United States firms, it is impossible to
judge, on the basis of present data, the net effect that questionable foreign payments
have had on the total foreign business of United States firms.
1097
The Yale Law Journal
assisting foreign businesses in Homos. The agent, who was not related
to any official or employee of the Homosian government, offered his
services. For a $100,000 commission he would "guarantee" that Octopus
would win the contract. Octopus executives told him that they would
think it over. Shortly thereafter, Octopus heard a fairly reliable rumor
that it was the lowest bidder. Octopus decided that it was possible that
it could lose the contract, even though it was the lowest bidder, because
criteria other than price could be considered in awarding the contract
(for example, whether the bidder is likely to perform adequately), and
that $100,000 would be a relatively meager sum in the event that the
contract was awarded to it. Before reaching an agreement with the
agent, Octopus executives asked him what he would do to assist Octo-
pus. He replied that he would advise them on how to proceed with
their bid and that he would contact the officials in charge of awarding
the contract and attempt to persuade them that Octopus was the most
reliable bidder. He also noted that he had a reputation for dealing
successfully with Homosian officials and that he was familiar with the
types of reasoning that had proven persuasive to them in the past. After
signing an agreement with the agent that specified his services as just
described, the Octopus executives gave the agent a check for $100,000.
Octopus was awarded the contract.
The possible kickback arose out of the same construction contract.
Before signing the contract, the Homosian officials told Octopus that
after the project had been completed and Octopus had been given its
last payment, Octopus would be required to rebate $150,000 to the
Ministry of Commerce. Such a payment was not illegal in Homos.
Octopus executives surmised that the Ministry was allocated monies
for certain kinds of projects, but not for other projects that it would
like to undertake. To secure funds for these other projects, the Min-
istry required rebates from its contractors. Octopus calculated that
even after paying a S150,000 rebate, it could still make a healthy
profit. It agreed to the terms set by the Homosian officials, and after
completion of the contract it delivered a $150,000 check made out to
the Ministry of Commerce.
The situation involving a possible extortion payment also occurred
in Homos. Under its construction contract, Octopus had to ship large
amounts of building materials through an overcrowded port. The
government-operated harbor facilities were so inadequate that an aver-
age waiting time of sixty days was required before a newly arrived ship
could be unloaded. It was well known, however, that some ships were
unloaded in thirty days or less, while others with similar cargos were
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unloaded after ninety days or more. When the first ship carrying
Octopus's materials arrived at the harbor, its captain was approached
by the harbornaster, a middle-level official of Homos. The harbor-
master described the procedures for mooring in the harbor. He also
explained some of the customs of Homos "so that the captain and crew
would feel welcome and comfortable during their visit." One such
custom was the exchanging of gifts. Indeed, before the harbormaster
left he gave the captain a small Homosian vase. Time was of the essence
for the Octopus construction contract. So, after waiting sixty-two days
to be unloaded, Octopus executives decided to give the harbormaster a
modest $200 gift of American greenbacks. Octopus's building materials
were immediately unloaded.
As luck would have it, after covering all expenses, including the
$100,000 sales commission, the $150,000 kickback, and the $200 gift to
the harbormaster, Octopus still had a large net profit from its contract.
Now, Octopus wants to know whether any of these three payments is
deductible as a business expense for United States income tax purposes.
Although the three payments do pose some common issues, at the out-
set it is most fruitful to analyze them separately.
A. The Bribe
Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code allows "as a deduction
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." We may assume that
the $100,000 "commission" paid to the agent is "ordinary and neces-
sary" within the meaning of section 162(a), °2 and there is no question
that Octopus is carrying on a trade or business. The critical question,
then, is whether the $100,000 "commission" falls within the scope of
section 162(c), which disallows deductions for certain bribes, kickbacks,
and other payments.
The $100,000 payment does not fall within the terms of section
162(c)(2), which provides:
Other illegal payments.-No deduction shall be allowed under
subsection (a) for any payment (other than a payment described in
paragraph (1)) made, directly or indirectly, to any person, if the
payment constitutes an illegal bribe, illegal kickback, or other
23. Throughout this discussion, it will be assumed that the payments arc "ordinary
and necessary" within the meaning of § 162(a), so that if they are not disallowed under
§ 162(c) they would also not be disallowed under § 162(a) either. Some payments beyond
the reach of § 162(c) may, of course, be nondeductible because they are so extraordinary
or so unnecessary as to fall outside the broad test of deductibility under § 162(a). See
pp. 1114, 1117 infra.
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illegal payment under any law of the United States, or under any
law of a State (but only if such State law is generally enforced),
which subjects the payor to a criminal penalty or the loss of license
or privilege to engage in a trade or business. For purposes of this
paragraph, a kickback includes a payment in consideration of the
referral of a client, patient, or customer. The burden of proof in
respect of the issue, for purposes of this paragraph, as to whether a
payment constitutes an illegal bribe, illegal kickback, or other il-
legal payment shall be upon the Secretary to the same extent as he
bears the burden of proof under section 7454 (concerning the
burden of proof when the issue relates to fraud).
The payment does not fall within this provision because the $100,-
000 "commission" would be illegal only if part or all of it were used
to bribe the Homosian officials. Yet section 162(c)(2) is not applicable
to payments to foreign officials. Section 162(c)(2) is entitled "[o]ther
illegal payments" and by its terms refers only to payments "other than
a payment described in [section 162(c)(1)]." Since section 162(c)(1)
covers direct or indirect payments "to an official or employee of a
foreign government," section 162(c)(2) does not cover such payments. 2 4
If the payment is to be disallowed as a deduction, then, it will have
to come within the prohibition of section 162(c)(1), which provides:
Illegal payments to government officials or employees.-No de-
duction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any payment
made, directly or indirectly, to an official or employee of any gov-
ernment, or of any agency or instrumentality of any government, if
the payment constitutes an illegal bribe or kickback or, if the pay-
ment is to an official or employee of a foreign government, the
payment would be unlawful under the laws of the United States if
such laws were applicable to such payment and to such official or
employee. The burden of proof in respect of the issue, for the
purposes of this paragraph, as to whether a payment constitutes an
illegal bribe or kickback (or would be unlawful under the laws of
the United States) shall be upon the Secretary to the same extent
as he bears the burden of proof under section 7454 (concerning
the burden of proof when the issue relates to fraud).
Section 162(c)(1) establishes two tests of deductibility: (1) whether the
payment is actually illegal and (2) whether the payment is hypothet-
24. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 274-75 (1969) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.
No. 91-552]. See also Alfred, Corporate Slush Funds: The Deductibility of "Se'nitive" Pay-
ments, 4 J. CORP. TAX 130, 138 (1977).
For discussions of § 162(c)(2), see Note, Deductibility of Overseas Commercial Bribes, 13
COLUNM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 235 (1977); Note, Federal Income Taxation-Public Policy and
the Deductibility of Kickbacks Under § 162(c)(2), 35 Onto Sr. L.J. 686 (1974).
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ically illegal. The hypothetical illegality test clearly applies to pay-
ments to officials or employees of a foreign government. It is arguable
that the actual illegality test also applies to such payments, 2 5 but the
question is solely academic. The regulations20  and legislative his-
25. There are two possibilities for such an application, one directly via the first clause
of § 162(c)(1) and another implicitly via the hypothetical illegality test. The actual
illegality test in the first clause of § 162(c)(1) appears on its face to apply to such pay-
ments because it covers, inter alia, payments "to an official or employee of any govern-
ment" (emphasis added). Under this interpretation, the hypothetical illegality test supple-
ments, rather than replaces, the actual illegality test so far as it concerns officials or em-
ployees of a foreign government. The difficulties with this interpretation are, first, that
Treasury Regulation § 1.162-18(a)(1)(i), which concerns the actual illegality test, specifically
includes payments only to "an official or employee of a government other than a foreign
government" (emphasis added). That regulation also omits any reference to payments to
agencies or instrumentalities of any government (foreign or domestic), which are included
in § 162(c)(1), but the omission of payments to foreign government officials or employees
is clearly deliberate. Moreoscr, such an omission appears consistent with legislative intent.
The 1969 Senate Report on the amendments creating the actual illegality test in the first
clause of § 162(c)(1) specifies that the test for deductibility of payments to foreign govern-
ment officials or employees would remain as it was under the original 1958 enactment, i.e.,
"whether the payment would be unlawful under U.S. laws, were U.S. laws applicable to
the payment." S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 24, at 275. Thus the first clause of § 162(c)(1)
does not make payments to foreign government officials or employees subject to the
actual illegality test.
The Commissioner could argue that illegal payments to foreign government officials
and employees are included implicitly in the hypothetical illegality test of the second
clause of § 162(c)(I). That is, the payments to such persons that are actually illegal arc
merely a subset of those payments that are h)pothetically illegal, since the Commissioner
could either (I) disregard the fact that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act actually applies
and analyze it for tax purposes via a legal fiction as if it did not, or else (2) argue that the
"would be unlawful" language includes both hypothetical and actual illegality. Legal
fictions are generally disfavored, so it is doubtful that the Commissioner would prevail on
that ground, but the second argument may be persuasive. Although the subjunctive mood
normally implies a contrary-to-fact situation, it is arguable that it could be interpreted to
include both categories, especially when the underlying policies so indicate, as is the case
here: at least the morality and foreign relations policy bases for denying deductibility for
bribes argue more strongly for den)ing deductibility to actually illegal bribes than to
hypothetically illegal bribes. On the other hand, Congress could not have intended this
result in either 1958 or 1969, because foreign bribes were not then proscribed by United
States law (although it is arguable Congress would have intended such a result if it had
addressed the issue). Because it would be so anomalous in terms of the policies under-
lying § 162(c)(1) to allow a deduction for an illegal bribe while denying deductibility to a
legal but hypothetically unlawful bribe, it is probable that a court would find that the
actual illegality test was implicit in the hypothetical illegality test, if forced to do so in
order to deny a deduction for an actually illegal bribe.
26. The relevant regulation provides:
(a) Illegal payments to government officials or employees-(l) In general. No de-
duction shall be allowed under section 162(a) for any amount paid or incurred, directly
or indirectly, to an official or employee of any government, or of any agency or other
instrumentality of any government, if-
(i) In the case of a payment made to an official or employee of a government other
than a foreign government described in subparagraph (3)(ii) or (iii) of this paragraph,
the payment constitutes an illegal bribe or kickback, or
(ii) In the case of a payment made to an official or employee of a foreign govern-
ment described in subparagraph (3)(ii) or (iii) of this paragraph, the making of the
payment would be unlawful under the laws of the United States (if such laws were
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tory2 7 strongly suggest that legality or illegality under foreign law is
irrelevant. As far as United States law is concerned, the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act, which is the only statute that directly proscribes
foreign bribes, appears to be sufficiently narrow so that any payment
it makes illegal would also be hypothetically illegal under the statutes
that prohibit bribery of United States government officials or em-
ployees.2 8 Thus Octopus can deduct the agent's commission only if it
passes the hypothetical illegality test.29 That test denies deductibility
for a payment to an official or employee of a foreign government if
"the payment would be unlawful under the laws of the United States
if such laws were applicable to such payment and to such official or
employee."
The hypothetical illegality test incorporates by reference the criminal
laws of the United States. 0 Bribery is specifically outlawed by federal
statute,31 and thus a direct or indirect payment to a foreign official to
influence his action would not be deductible. The central problem
facing Octopus in preparing its tax return is that it does not know
whether any of its payment to the agent ended up in the hands of
applicable to the payment and to the official or employee at the time the expenses
were paid or incurred).
No deduction shall be allowed for an accrued expense if the eventual payment thereof
would fall within the prohibition of this section. The place where the expenses are
paid or incurred is immaterial. For purposes of subdivision (ii) of this subparagraph,
lawfulness or unlawfulness of the payment under the laws of the foreign country is
immaterial.
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18(a)(1) (emphasis added).
27. S. REP. No. 85-1983, supra note 12, at 125.
28. The Act prohibits only bribery that involves use of the mails or other means or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 103(a), 104(a), 91 Stat.
1495, 1496 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78ff). The domestic antibribery statute,
18 U.S.C. § 201 (1970), does not include any such requirement. Moreover, the Act does not
apply to bribes of foreign officials "whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical,"
Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 103(a), 104(d), 91 Stat. 1496, 1498 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78dd-l, 78dd-2), or to bribes whose purpose is not to obtain, retain, or direct business,
Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 103(a), 104(a), 91 Stat. 1495-97 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l,
78dd-2). Again, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1970) does not exempt such bribes. Finally, the Act does
not apply to payments by foreign subsidiaries, see H. CONF. REP. No. 95-831, supra note
3, at 14. Such payments would be unlawful if 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1970) applied.
It may be that certain acts proscribed by the Act-for example, payments to foreign
political parties or officials thereof or candidates for foreign political office-would not
be unlawful under United States laws. Assuming this to be the case, such payments are
not payments to officials or employees of a foreign government and thus would be dealt
with under § 162(c)(2) rather than under § 162(c)(1).
29. There is nothing in the language of § 162(c)(1) to prevent the nondeductibility of a
hypothetically illegal payment merely because it also happens to be actually illegal under
a different statute.
30. Treasury Regulations define the term "'laws of the United States" to include "only
Federal statutes, including State laws which are assimilated into Federal law by Federal
statute, and legislative and interpretative regulations thereunder. The term shall also be
limited to statutes which prohibit some act or acts, for the violation of which there is a
civil or criminal penalty." Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18(a)(4).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1970).
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Homosian officials or, if so, whether its payment would be considered
an illegal bribe.
The circumstances do suggest, of course, that at least some of the
agent's commission may have reached the outstretched palms of govern-
ment officials. In one view, the sum of $100,000 seems quite large in
relation to the agent's undertaking to advise Octopus and to attempt to
persuade the Homosian officials. Notably, the agent played no role in
putting together the Octopus bid or in introducing Octopus to the
Homosian bureaucracy during the initial stages of bidding. On the
other hand, the use of agents or commercial representatives is wide-
spread and often a virtual necessity;3 2 the work involved may stretch
over many months and may involve employees of the agent; both
parties may find it advantageous to set the price before the amount of
work required becomes known; and there may well be a seller's market
in the knowledge of the local culture and bureaucracy and the political
judgment legitimately utilized in facilitating commercial transactions
in foreign countries. This is especially true in developing countries,
where amorphous criteria such as "economic development" 33 or "public
interest ' 34 must often be satisfied before an investment project or
contract can be approved by the government.
Although the use to which the $100,000 payment was put is not
clear, the amount of the payment was probably large enough that it
raised, or should have raised, a suspicion in the minds of Octopus
executives that the agent was using part of his payment from Octopus
to bribe Homosian officials. With its honest suspicions, but without
conclusive facts or reason to know one way or the other, can Octopus
deduct its payment to the agent? 5 Unfortunately, the Code, regula-
tions, legislative history, policy considerations, and criminal statutes do
not provide a clear answer.
1. The Code
Section 162(c)(1) prohibits deductions for direct or indirect payments
to Homosian officials if such payments would be unlawful under
32. See generally Shamma & Morrison, The Ue of Local Represenlatives in Saudi
Arabia, 11 INT'L LAw. 453 (1977); see also Note, supra note 2, at 238 n.43.
33. See Shamma & Morrison, supra note 32, at 456.
34. In certain countries, patents cannot be granted on inventions deemed contrary to
public or social interest. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, TnE
ROLE OF TIlE PATENT SYSTEi IN TIHE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY "fo DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
UNCTAD TD/B/AC.II/19/ Rev. 1, 346, 348-50 (1975).
35. We do not consider whether Octopus would have the obligation tinder some cir-
cumstances to ascertain the way in which the agent disposed of his sales commission, or
assuming that some obligation might exist, the extent to which Octopus would be required
to go behind representations made by the agent.
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United States law. Any part of Octopus's payment to the agent that did
reach Homosian officials cannot be considered a direct payment to
those officials because Octopus did not itself pay the officials or tell
the agent to do so. Whether the payment to the agent could be con-
sidered an indirect payment to Homosian officials is not answered by
the Code. In construing the term "indirectly" in other sections of the
Code, courts have held that the term is to be given a broad reading
unless the legislative history shows that Congress intended the section
to have a restricted application."0 Such a restrictive intent has been
found regarding only one section containing this term . The legislative
history of section 162(c)(1) gives no indication of a restrictive intent, 8
and it seems certain that the courts would construe "indirectly" to
include any payment that has the same effect as a payment made
directly.39 Even a broad interpretation of the term "indirectly," how-
36. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694 (1947); Charles Town, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 372 F.2d 415 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967); Ach v. Com-
missioner, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966); Young & Rubicam,
Inc. v. United States, 410 F.2d 1233 (Ct. CL. 1969).
37. See Semel v. Commissioner, 33 TAx CT. ME.. DEc. (CCH) 248, 252 (1974) (I.R.C.
§ 1239); 10-42 Corp. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 593, 598 n.4 (1971) (not acquiesced in on
this issue, 1972-2 C.B. 4) (same).
38. See pp. 1094-97 supra.
39. The relevant regulation also suggests that "indirectly" will be broadly construed:
(2) Indirect payment. For purposes of this paragraph, an indirect payment to an
individual shall include any payment which inures to his benefit or promotes his in-
terests, regardless of the medium in which the payment is made and regardless of the
identity of the immediate recipient or payor. Thus, for example, payment made to an
agent, relative, or independent contractor of an official or employee, or even directly
into the general treasury of a foreign country of which the beneficiary is an official
or employee, may be treated as an indirect payment to the official or employee, if in
fact such payment inures or will inure to his benefit or promotes or will promote his
financial or other interests. A payment made by an agent or independent contractor
of the taxpayer which benefits the taxpayer shall be treated as an indirect payment
by the taxpayer to the official or employee.
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18(a)(2).
This definition of "indirect payment" is an expansion of the pre-1975 definition. Com-
pare Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18 (1975) (current version) with Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18, T.D.
6448, 1960-1 C.B. 54-55 (pre-1975 version). Added to the pre-1975 definition were the
terms "relative" and "independent contractor" of a government official or employee,
the reference to "payor" in the first sentence, and the last sentence, which mentions agents
and independent contractors of the taxpayer. The regulation as it now stands is so broad
that serious difficulties may arise in applying it fairly. For example, payments to any
"relative" (a term that is nowhere limited to members of the immediate family) of a
government official or employee potentially fall within the regulation. The broad inter-
pretation generally given "indirectly," see note 36 supra; the phrase "inures to or is
promotional of"; the close scrutiny with which the Commissioner examines intrafamily
relationships in other contexts; and the well-known propensity for nepotism among
powerful groups in some countries indicate that payments to relatives could be considered
indirect payments even before 1975. The fact that "relatives" were not specifically flagged
under the original regulation, however, may reflect the extreme difficulties of distinguish-
ing payments to relatives that are deductible from those that are not. This is especially
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ever, tells little about how Octopus's payment fares under the hypo-
thetical illegality test.
Yet the last sentence of section 162(c)(1) suggests that in the absence
of conclusive evidence a deduction will be allowed. "The burden of
proof... as to whether a payment constitutes an illegal bribe or kick-
back (or would be unlawful under the laws of the United States) shall
be upon the Secretary . . . ." Under this standard, the Commissioner
must prove that a payment is a nondeductible bribe or kickback by
clear and convincing evidence.40
2. The Regulations
The regulations declare that a payment made without the payor's
knowledge or suspicion that any part of the payment will be used as a
bribe will still be disallowed as a deduction if "in fact" such payment
inures to the benefit of a government official.4 1 This indicates an ob-
jective, after-the-fact test.
Such an after-the-fact test is not consistent with the Code. The Code
requires that, in order to be nondeductible, a payment be an illegal
bribe or kickback or be unlawful under United States laws if such laws
were applicable. The test of deductibility, therefore, necessarily in-
corporates the test of legality under United States criminal law. As is
discussed below, the applicable criminal statutes require that the payor
have at least some level of knowledge or intent that the payment is to
be passed on to a government official. 42 By making a payment non-
deductible because it is ultimately used to bribe a government official
even when the initial payor does not know or have reason to know that
the payment will be used in this fashion, the regulation fails to imple-
ment Congress's mandate in a reasonable manner and is therefore
invalid. 43
Moreover, even assuming that the regulation is valid, it does not
give Octopus any concrete guidance. Octopus still does not know
whether any of the payment "in fact" reached or inured to the benefit
of government officials.
true in societies where joint families are common, which increases the likelihood of a
payment "inuring to the benefit of" a relative, or where families involved in powerful
positions in the government are also likely to be similarly involved in other sectors of the
economy, which increases the likelihood that a purely commercial transaction will in-
Nolve relatives of government officials.
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18(b)(4).
41. See note 39 supra.
42. See pp. 1110-12 inlra.
43. See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967).
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3. Legislative Histoiy
The legislative history of section 162(c) is inconclusive on the de-
ductibility of Octopus's payment. The section was originally enacted
primarily to discourage behavior that Congress viewed as "wrong" or
"immoral." 44 "Wrongfulness" and "immorality" are not defined in the
legislative history, nor is the hypothetical illegality test explained.
Subsequent amendments to section 162(c) similarly afford little
guidance. The Tax Reform Act of 1969-1 amended section 162 and
effectively overruled the public policy doctrine, which the Commis-
sioner had used to disallow deductions for expenses thought to con-
travene sharply defined public policies, even though the Code did not
specify that such expenses were nondeductible.4 The 1969 amend-
ments disallowed deductions for treble damages awarded in antitrust
suits, fines for violations of laws, bribes to public officials, and other
unlawful bribes and kickbacks.4 7 The fact that Congress chose to
isolate four specific kinds of expenses to disallow as deductions in-
dicates that other expenses would be deductible.4 8 Octopus might argue
from this statutory pattern of tightly circumscribed exceptions to the
general deductibility of business expenses that doubts are to be resolved
in favor of deductibility. But the Commissioner could argue that no-
tions of public policy should be used to define the reach of the four
statutory exceptions to deductibility, even if the old public policy
doctrine can no longer be used to create new exceptions. On this view,
even if the application of section 162(c)(1) is unclear, it should be used
to disallow deductions for payments that have the same effect as those
specifically disallowed. Such an approach would also be consistent with
the broad construction of "indirect" payments that appears to be
warranted under the Code.4 9
When section 162(c)(2) was amended in 1971, changes were not
made in section 162(c)(1). The amendment of section 162(c)(2) was
44. See pp. 1094-95 supra.
45. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 902, 83 Stat. 710-11 (1969).
46. See note 12 supra.
47. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 902, 83 Stat. 710-11 (1969).
48. Some legislative history supports this inference. The Senate Report stated: "The
provision for the denial of the deduction for payments in these situations which are
deemed to violate public policy is intended to be all inclusive. Public policy, in other
circumstances, generally is not sufficiently clearly defined to justify the disallowance of
deductions," S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 24, at 274. A recent amendment to the
regulations also indicates that a deduction for otherwise allowable business expenses will
not be denied on grounds of conflict with sharply defined public policy. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-1(a) (as amended by T.D. 7345 (1975)).
49. See p. 1104 supra.
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intended to disallow deductions previously allowed-5° On the one hand,
the Commissioner could argue from the amendment to section 162(c)(2)
that Congress intended section 162(c) generally to have a broad cover-
age and that doubts about its coverage should therefore be resolved
against deductibility. On the other hand, Octopus could argue that,
because section 162(c)(2) was amended but section 162(c)(1) was not,
the latter should not be so broadly construed. Neither argument is
especially persuasive; it is doubtful that the 1971 amendment to sec-
tion 162(c)(2) has any significant implications for the interpretation of
section 162(c)(1).
4. Policy Considerations
The Commissioner or Octopus might also turn to the policy con-
siderations disfavoring bribes-that bribes are "wrong," that they may
adversely affect United States foreign policy, and that they cause unfair
competition and possible misallocation of resources-in determining
whether Octopus's payment to the agent should be deductible. If indeed
Octopus's agent made any payments to Homosian officials, both the
nature and the amount of those particular payments are relevant to the
relationship between these policy considerations and the deductibility
of the payment in question.
Analyzing the agent's payments with respect to the first policy consid-
eration, that bribes are "wrong," is difficult because Congress did not
explain why it thought that bribes were "wrong." Several approaches
could be taken to assessing the wrongfulness of a payment. One could
argue that the agent's payments are less objectionable than payments
intended to influence decisions about more vital interests of the country
involved, such as national security. Still, the tendency of these pay-
ments to corruptal is no less than that of other payments, and the fact
that these payments may be less objectionable than others offers no
guidance as to whether they are deductible so long as the other pay-
ments are not deductible. A second possible approach is that, because
Octopus submitted the low bid, it was entitled to the contract even
without the payments.52 Because criteria other than price could be
considered in awarding the contract, however, no such claim is likely
to be provable. Finally, one could focus on the amount of the payments,
50. S. REP. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 72-73 (1971); 117 CONG. REC. 45854 (1971) (Rep.
Mills); see p. 1100 supra.
51. A payment's tendency to corrupt is best siewed as both an element of that pay-
ment's "wrongfulness" and as a reason why it may adversely affect United States foreign
policy. See S. REP. No. 94-1031, supra note 15, at 3-5; pp. 1095-96 supra.
52. See pp. 1118-19 infra.
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even though their amount is irrelevant in the sense that if a payment is
"wrong" in the abstract, it is "wrong" no matter what its amount. In
practical terms, however, a large payment is more likely to influence its
recipient and therefore has a greater tendency to corrupt than a smallO
payment has. Because the agent's payments could be as high as
,$100,0O, 3 Octopus cannot argue that the payments must have been
so small that they had no significant tendency to corrupt their
recipients. And even that argument would run afoul of the view that
all bribes are "wrong." The Commissioner, on the other hand, cannot
argue that the amount is so large as to be extremely reprehensible, be-
cause the amount of the payments is unknown. In sum, then, the
policy consideration that bribes are "wrong" provides no clear guidance
in determining whether Octopus should be allowed to deduct all its
payments to the agent.
The second policy consideration, that bribes may adversely affect
United States foreign policy, also provides no significant guidance.
First, on this consideration deductibility should depend on a payment's
relation to the laws and mores of the country involved-according to
which that country's reaction to the bribe will be determined-rather
than on its hypothetical illegality under United States law. 54 Yet such
reference to foreign law is declared by the regulations5 and legislative
history50 to be irrelevant. Second, payment-by-payment analysis of the
effect on United States foreign policy would be unworkable (even dis-
regarding the foreign law question) because the effect of a given pay-
ment can only be conjectured.57
The situation is similar with respect to the third policy considera-
tion, that bribes cause unfair competition and possible misallocation
53. The amount of the agent's payments is, of course, unknown in this hypothetical
example. Assuming that he did make payments, however, it is doubtful that he would pay
out more than he receihed from Octopus, even to preserve his reputation as a successful
agent, without at least attempting to obtain more funds from Octopus.
54. United States law should be relevant only to the extent that foreign reaction may
be influenced by whether the deduction would be disallowed if the payment had been
made to an American official or by any tacit approval of the payment that deductibility
implies.
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18(a)(2).
56. S. REP. No. 85-1983, supra note 12, at 125.
57. For example, the Commissioner might argue that the payments contravene the
objective of promoting the free enterprise system. See S. REP,. No. 94-1031, supra note 15,
at 3-4. Octopus could respond that, if this is true, it is true of all bribes, and that it may
be less true here because Octopus was the low bidder. The amount of the payments is not
directly significant because their effect on foreign policy depends on their influence, not
on their size. On the other hand, a large bribe is more likely to be influential than a small
bribe and is also more likely to attract widespread publicity if disclosed. The possible
amount involved in the agent's payments does not allow Octopus to argue that the amount
is so small as to be clearly uninfluential or unlikely to attract publicity if disclosed, nor
do the known facts allow the Commissioner to argue the converse.
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of resources. Octopus could argue that the other bidders or their agents
also paid bribes to the Homosian officials. But this would probably
be impossible to prove, and, even if provable, resources may still have
been misallocated to the extent that Octopus is less efficient than the
bidder that would have been awarded the contract had the bribe not
been made. An argument by Octopus that no misallocation occurred
because it was entitled to the contract as the low bidder would also
fail, because it would be difficult to prove the influence of criteria other
than price in awarding the contract. Moreover, Octopus cannot argue
that any unfairness in competition that did occur had to have been
de minimis, because the possible amount of the bribe remains large and
the contract amount is even larger. The Commissioner, on the other
hand, cannot use this consideration unless he knows details of the
payments, which we assume that, since any bribe was paid by the
agent, neither he nor Octopus knows, at least prior to filing.58
5. The Criminal Law
Because the test of deductibility depends on the hypothetical illegal-
ity of a payment under United States criminal laws, Octopus's tax
lawyers will have to consult criminal statutes and cases to determine the
proper treatment of the payment to the agent. After doing so, they can
conclude only that the test for deductibility under section 162(c)(1) is
confusing and uncertain.
Two different issues confront Octopus's lawyers. First, assuming that
when Octopus paid the $100,000 to the agent it intended to influence
Homosian officials improperly and thus that Octopus had the intent
requisite for criminal liability under United States law, is the payment
nevertheless deductible if Octopus later discovers that none of the
money actually reached the hands of Homosian officials? In United
States v. Jacobs,9 the Second Circuit held that the antibribery statute00
58. For a discussion of Octopus's obligations if it later discovers that the agent paid
Homosian officials, see p. 1112 infra.
59. 431 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1971).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1970) provides:
Whoever, directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of value
to any public official or person who has been selected to be a public official, or offers
or promises any public official or any person who has been selected to be a public
official to give anything of value to any other person or entity, with intent-
(1) to influence any official act; or
(2) to influence such public official or person who has been selected to be a public
official to commit or aid in committing, or collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make
opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the United States; or
(3) to induce such public official or such person who has been selected to be a
public official to do or omit to do any act in violation of his lawful duty . . . [shall
be fined or imprisoned].
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could be violated even though the official to whom the bribe was
offered was not corrupted thereby, the object of the bribe could not be
obtained, or there had not been an actual occasion to seek to influence
official conduct.01 Thus the intent to bribe, when coupled with acts
sufficient to constitute an attempt to do so, appears to be enough to
support a criminal conviction. Here, if Octopus had the requisite intent
when it paid the agent, the antibribery statute would support a con-
viction for attempted bribery if such laws were applicable. The act
of paying the agent was not merely preparatory activity, because it
was the last act that Octopus would have had to do to carry out its
intended bribe. If paying the agent would have been illegal, then the
payment would not be deductible, regardless of whether the agent
actually bribed anyone.
The second question is more difficult: what is the level of intent
required for criminal liability? The statutory provisions that might be
applicable to the payment appear to have different requirements. One
provision, 18 U.S.C. section 201(b), 62 has been interpreted to require
"corrupt intent to influence or be influenced in official conduct." 63
Another provision, 18 U.S.C. section 201(f),64 appears to require a
lesser degree of intent. In United States v. Irwin, 5 the Second Circuit
approved jury instructions that stated that this section requires neither
the "evil" or "corrupt" intent required by 18 U.S.C. section 201(b) nor
an "intent to influence the public official" to whom the payment was
made.66 The full meaning of the instructions is somewhat cloudy be-
cause they also stated that the defendant must "willingly and know-
ingly, that is, intentionally as distinguished from inadvertently or negli-
gently" have given money "because of official acts performed or to be
performed [by the recipient]." 67
In a later case, United States v. Barash,"" the Second Circuit seemed
61. 431 F.2d at 759-60. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supra note 3, at 8 (term "corruptly"
does not require that act be fully consummated or succeed in its purpose); S. REP. No.
95-114, supra note 3, at 10 (same).
62. See note 60 supra.
63. United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
991 (1975).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 201(f) (1970) provides:
Whoever, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official
duty, directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any public
official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, for or be-
cause of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official, former
public official, or person selected to be a public official . . . [shall be fined or im-
prisoned].
65. 354 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966).
66. Id. at 197 n.3.
67. Id.
68. 365 F.2d 395, 401-02 (2d Cir. 1966).
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to suggest that 18 U.S.C. section 201(b) required specific intent, whereas
18 U.S.C. section 201(f) did not. Barash involved, in part, a prosecution
under 18 U.S.C. section 201(f) for payments allegedly made by the de-
fendant to Internal Revenue agents for favorable audits of the de-
fendant's clients. At a second trial, the defendant testified that the acts
charged in the complaint consisted of a payment made because of the
defendant's sympathy for an agent's economic situation, Christmas gifts
to create a better working atmosphere, and a gratuitous lunch after the
conclusion of an audit. On the second appeal, the court clearly stated
that "criminal intent" was required, but that "specific intent" was not,
and that "[i]n measuring intent, it matters not whether the payments
were made because of economic duress, a desire to create a better work-
ing atmosphere, or appreciation for a speedy and favorable audit."' 9
This suggests-albeit not too clearly-that the level of requisite intent
is not very high.
The Ninth Circuit has held, however, that the evidence in a prose-
cution under 18 U.S.C. section 201(f) "must show that something
of value was given 'a public official . . .for or because of any official
act performed or to be performed by such public official'. ",0 And
the District of Columbia Circuit has specifically held that 18 U.S.C.
section 201(g), which forbids the receipt of payments illegal under
section 201(f), requires a higher degree of intent than that evidenced
in Barash, at least regarding payments to elected officials: the de-
fendant must have intended to receive the payment "'otherwise than
as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duties . . .
for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by
him'."71 Thus the Ninth Circuit and the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit both seem to require a higher degree of intent than does the
Second Circuit. According to this standard, which seems to be cor-
rect given the language of the statute, the general intent to make
a payment to a government official would not suffice.
The statutes and cases do not provide a clear definition of the intent
required for criminal liability, and the Code's incorporation of criminal
statutes into its test for deductibility unfortunately incorporates the
vagueness of those statutes as well. Vague definitions of intent are
undesirable in the criminal context, but may be acceptable because of
the desire to deter persons from conduct near the borders of criminality.
Such vagueness, however, is even less favored in the tax context, where
69. United States v. Barash, 412 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 832 (1969).
70. United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1976).
71. United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see id. at 72 n.26.
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predictability is important in tax planning and where one major pur-
pose of permitting deductions is to tax accurately a person's net income.
In summary, the statutes and cases do not provide a definition of
intent that tells clearly whether Octopus must refrain from deducting
a portion of its payment to the agent and, if so, how much. Espe-
cially because improper deductions can lead to criminal penalties or
penalties for fraud or negligent disregard,"2 the requisite intent should
be at least that the principal should have known that the agent would
pay government officials. Octopus probably did not have sufficient
reason to know that this would occur. And even if it did have sufficient
reason, it still would not know the probable or actual amounts of such
payments, so the amount Octopus should refrain from deducting would
also be unknown.
6. Timing of the Return
In deciding whether its payment to the agent is deductible, Octopus
may face questions that revolve around the timing of filing its return.
Suppose, for example, that at the time it made its payment to the agent,
Octopus had no reason to believe that the payment would be used by
the agent as a bribe. Shortly thereafter, but before Octopus files its
return, it discovered that the agent did use a part of the payment to
bribe some Homosian officials. Can Octopus deduct the payment?
Another question might arise after Octopus has filed its return. Suppose
Octopus properly claims a deduction in light of the facts of which it
was aware at the time it filed its return, but later discovers that the
agent had bribed officials with Octopus's money. Would Octopus have
an obligation to file an amended return?
Under the present statute the answer to both questions is deceptively
simple. Section 162(c)(1) makes deductibility depend on hypothetical
illegality. Such illegality depends in turn on Octopus's intent at the
time of payment, not on the factual circumstances that might ultimately
develop. Thus in both situations the payment to the agent would be
deductible.
72. A taxpayer (including an officer or employee of a corporate taxpayer) who willfully
attempts to evade or defeat the payment of income taxes is guilty of a felony and subject
to imprisonment for five years, a $10,000 fine, or both, together with the costs of prosecu-
tion. I.R.C. § 7201. A willful failure to pay any tax, file a return, keep records, or supply
information is a misdemeanor. I.R.C. § 7203. A penalty of 50% of the underpayment is
assessed when any part of the underpayment was due to fraud. I.R.C. § 6653(b). A penalty
of five percent of the underpayment may be imposed for negligent or intentional dis-
regard of the tax rules and regulations. I.R.C. § 6653(a).
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B. The Kickback
Octopus's second payment might be characterized as a $150,000 kick-
back to the Ministry of Commerce of Homos. If this payment were
unlawful under United States law-which it probably is not 73-then it
would be nondeductible under the first part of section 162(c)(1), which
denies deductibility for illegal bribes or kickbacks paid to an official,
employee, agency, or instrumentality of any government. Notice, how-
ever, that the applicable regulation is narrower than the statute.74 The
regulation would disallow deductions for (i) illegal bribes or kickbacks
paid to an official or employee of a government other than a foreign
government, and (ii) hypothetically illegal payments made to an official
or employee of a foreign government. Thus the regulation does not
cover either actually or hypothetically illegal payments to an agency or
instrumentality of any government. Notice also that the regulation con-
cerning this part of section 162(c)(1) does not declare lawfulness or
unlawfulness under the laws of the foreign country to be irrelevant, as
it does regarding the hypothetical illegality test.7 The reason for this
difference is not evident.
The first part of section 162(c)(1) treats illegal kickbacks to a govern-
ment agency or instrumentality in the same way in which it treats
illegal bribes to a government official or employee. The second part of
section 162(c)(1), however, denies deductibility to hypothetically illegal
payments made only to an official or employee, but not to an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign government. Since Octopus's $150,000
kickback was paid to the Ministry of Commerce, an agency of the
Homosian government, and not to "an official or employee of a foreign
government," the payment would be deductible even if it would be
unlawful under the laws of the United States, were they applicable.
The reason for this inconsistent treatment of hypothetically unlawful
payments to individuals and government agencies is not apparent.70
The Commissioner might attempt nonetheless to disallow the
$150,000 deduction by reviving the old public policy doctrine. Yet
73. Although the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has yet to be interpreted, we believe
that such a payment probably would be considered not to have been made with the
"corrupt" intent required by the Act. See note 3 supra.
74. See note 26 supra.
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18(a)(1)(i). S. REP. No. 85-1983, supra note 12, at 125, declares
legality or illegality under foreign law to be irrelevant to the deductibility of payments
to foreign government officials or employees, but this was before the language regarding
kickbacks was added to § 162(c)(1).
76. A deduction for this payment could not be disallowed tinder § 162(c)(2) for the
same reasons that the pa)mcnt to the agent could not be denied deductibility. See pp.
1099-1100 supra.
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even in its strongest form, the public policy doctrine would probably
not reach this payment. A deduction was allowed under the old public
policy doctrine where the kickback: (1) was not illegal; (2) did not
relate to a transaction that constitutes unfair competition under the
Federal Trade Commission Act; (3) was "ordinary" in the sense of
being normal, usual, and customary in the community; (4) was appro-
priate and helpful in obtaining business; and (5) was paid to persons
with whom the taxpayer was doing business or, if paid to an employee
of such a person, was made with the knowledge of that person. 7
Under these criteria the only question for Octopus is whether its
payment was "ordinary." The meaning of "ordinary" is illustrated by
Lilly v. Commissioner.78 In Lilly the taxpayer paid kickbacks to doc-
tors who prescribed glasses made by the taxpayer. The kickbacks were
found to be "ordinary" because they were the common practice in
the community and "necessary" because they were required to meet
competition. Assuming that Octopus's payment was part of a common
practice and necessary to meet competition, then even under the old
public policy doctrine it would be deductible.
Moreover, the policy considerations disfavoring bribes lend some
support to the deductibility of this kickback. First, because the pay-
ment was made directly to the agency and was open and obviously
traceable, the possibility of corruption is reduced and, in fact, is likely
to have been small. Second, unfair competition in the normal sense does
not occur because such payments are demanded equally from anyone
awarded a contract and because that fact presumably is or will be
known by bidders on such contracts (which makes the payment similar
to a tax, albeit one assessed and collected by only one part of the
government). Third, investments may be affected because the funds
may be used for projects not selected by the government as a whole,
but the deviation from the government's investment priorities will
presumably be less severe than if the $150,000 had gone to an indi-
vidual for personal use. Nevertheless, that this kickback is less ob-
jectionable than the typical bribe is not conclusive in favor of de-
ductibility, because the typical bribe is not deductible.
77. Rev. Rul. 58-479, 1958-2 C.B. 60; cf. Pittsburgh Milk Co. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.
707 (1956) (violation of public policy made expense nondeductible but doctrine had no
application in determining taxpayer's gross income; thus, money received by taxpayer and
subsequently kicked back to purchaser could be treated as type of rebate that in effect
reduced purchase price received by taxpayer). For the view of the Commissioner contrary
to Pittsburgh Milk, see Rev. Rul. 62-194, 1962-2 C.B. 57. See also United Draperies, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 41 T.C. 457, afj'd, 340 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 813
(1965).
78. 343 U.S. 90 (1952). See generally Schwartz, Business Expenses Contrary to Public
Policy: An Evaluation of the Lilly Case, 8 TAX L. Rrv. 241 (1953).
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C. The Extortion Payment
The third payment-the $200 gift to the harbormaster-appears to
be an extortion payment even though the harbormaster did not ex-
plicitly demand the payment to expedite the unloading of Octopus's
building materials. As with the bribe and the kickback, this payment
does not appear to be unlawful under the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act,79 and, in any event, the appropriate test is hypothetical illegality.
Cases decided under the domestic antibribery statute, 18 U.S.C.
section 201(b), and the domestic antigratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. sec-
tion 201(f), suggest that Octopus's payment to the harbormaster may
not be deductible. The Second Circuit has held that extortion based
on a threat of economic harm is not a complete defense under either
statute, but is only evidence of a lack of the requisite intent to bribe
and is irrelevant to the intent required to violate the antigratuity
statute. s0 Under this standard, Octopus's payment to the harbormaster
would not be deductible.
Octopus could make a substantial argument, however, that eco-
nomic coercion by a government official should be treated as a com-
plete defense under either statute for purposes of determining the
deductibility of questionable foreign payments. The Second Circuit
has explained that a threat of economic harm was not a complete
defense to bribery because "[t]he proper response to coercion by
corrupt public officials should be to go to the authorities, not to
make the payoff.""' Such a policy is less compelling with respect
to payments made in a country where the law enforcement officials
themselves may be receiving payments or where reporting coercion will
itself result in the threatened harm. Also, whereas federal courts are
under an obligation to encourage compliance with all federal statutes,
including that prohibiting extortion,82 they are not under any obliga-
79. Although the Act has yet to be interpreted, we believe that such a payment was
not made to "assist ... in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business
to, any person." Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 103(a),
104(a), 91 Stat. 1495-97 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l, 78dd-2). In addition, the
harbormaster in the hypothetical may qualify as an official "whose duties are essentially
ministerial or clerical." Id. See note 3 supra.
80. United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395, 401-02 (2d Cir. 1966). The conclusion in
Barash that proof of extortion is irrelevant to the antigratuity statute is open to serious
question on two grounds. First, the Barash court arguably applied the wrong standard
of intent in reaching its conclusion. See p. 1111 supra. Second, it seems highly un-
likely that Congress intended, in enacting § 201(f), to make everyone who submits to
economic coercion by a government official criminally liable.
81. United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 278 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970). See B. Toms, The Status of Extorted Payments under
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (Dec. 30, 1977) (unpublished manuscript on
file with Yale Law Journal).
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tion to encourage compliance with foreign antiextortion laws. More-
over, efforts by United States businesses to enforce foreign antiextor-
tion statutes may harm both United States business interests and
United States foreign policy, especially where high government officials
are involved in extortion schemes. Finally, the recent enactment of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act supports the treatment of extor-
tion as a complete defense as far as questionable foreign payments
are concerned. Foreign payments based on at least certain types of
economic coercion (and perhaps all types of economic coercion) most
probably are legal under the Act.83 In explaining the decision not
to prohibit certain foreign payments that were objectionable in the
United States, the House Report stated:
While payments made to assure or to speed the proper per-
formance of a foreign official's duties may be reprehensible in
the United States, the committee recognizes that they are not
necessarily so viewed elsewhere in the world and that it is not
feasible for the United States to attempt unilaterally to eradicate
all such payments. As a result, the committee has not attempted
to reach such payments. 8 4
These same arguments apply to hypothetical illegality under the anti-
gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. section 201(f). A substantial argument
exists, therefore, that extortion payments to foreign government of-
ficials would be deductible per se even if based on economic co-
ercion. Under this standard, Octopus could probably deduct its $200
payment.
The Commissioner may rely on much earlier cases that disallowed
deductions for extortion payments. But the continuing authority of
these decisions may be questioned because they predated the demise of
the public policy doctrine and because extortion payments are not now
explicitly disallowed by the Code.
Even assuming that these older cases have some current relevance,
there is good reason to distinguish them from Octopus's situation. In
Bonney v. Commissionel;38 a taxpayer married a woman whose divorce
decree had prohibited her from remarriage. The marriage was an-
nulled, but the taxpayer's putative wife made derogatory accusations
that the taxpayer feared would adversely affect his professional reputa-
tion. To solve his problem, the taxpayer gave money and property to
83. See note 3 supra. Although "grease" payments are not defined in the Act, they
include many, and arguably all, extortion payments. See pp. 1117-18 infra.
84. H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supra note 3, at 8; see S. REP. No. 94-1031, supra note 15,
at 6-7 (similar language).
85. 247 F.2d 237 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 906 (1957).
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his putative wife and claimed a deduction. The deduction was dis-
allowed. Bonney is easily distinguishable because the payments were
remotely connected with the taxpayer's business; that is, they were
made to deal with a marital problem that affected the taxpayer's busi-
ness only indirectly.
Two other cases involved payments directly connected with the tax-
payer's business. In Reliable Milk &' Cream Co.86 amounts paid to
racketeers under fear of beatings of milk dealers and burning of trucks
were held not to be deductible. Kelley-Dempsey & Co. v. Commis-
sioner8 involved payments made to an employee of a company for
which the taxpayer was laying pipelines. The payments were made to
secure relief from arbitrary demands by the company's inspectors. The
taxpayer's "work under its contracts was impeded through harassing
tactics," but after "it 'greased some palms', its work was accepted."8
The court held that the payments were not deductible.
In both Reliable Milk and Kelley-Dempsey the courts reasoned that
the expenses were not "ordinary," because they did not proximately
result from the ordinary conduct of business, and that the payments
were not "necessary" even though they were the easiest way of dealing
with the situation. The reasoning of the courts on this latter point was
based on the fact that the taxpayer could have sought protection from
the proper authorities rather than making the extortion payments.
The reasoning of these cases suggests that Octopus's extortion pay-
ment may deserve different tax treatment. First, what is considered
"ordinary" in the United States may be very different from what is
considered "ordinary" in other countries. Second, the payments in
foreign countries may be "necessary" because there may be no alterna-
tive method of protection. If Octopus had not made its payment, un-
fortunate consequences could have followed, and there may or may not
have existed authorities who could have or would have provided pro-
tection. There is, however, one aspect of the cases that have disallowed
deductions that is applicable to Octopus's payment. By allowing deduc-
tions, such payments are made less burdensome to the payor and de-
mands for such payments are encouraged.
In sum, these cases do not indicate that Octopus's extortion pay-
ment is nondeductible, because their authority has been swept away
with the public policy doctrine and because they are distinguishable
from Octopus's situation.
86. 7 B.T.A.M. (P-H) f" 38,290 (1938).
87. 31 B.T.A. 351 (1934).
88. Id. at 353-54.
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III. The Problem of Conceptual Distinctions
Certain of Octopus's tax problems exist only because its payments
fall on the borderlines of what are otherwise clear tests of deductibility.
It would be fair to say, for example, that bribes generally are not de-
ductible and that a substantial argument exists that extortion payments
are deductible. If such a dichotomy in tax treatment does exist, then
the distinction between a bribe and an extortion payment becomes
crucial.
Octopus's $100,000 payment to the agent was labeled a possible
"bribe." If it was a bribe, and therefore hypothetically illegal under
United States law, then it would not be deductible. But might Octopus
contend that it was an extortion payment and thus possibly deductible?
The answer depends on a conceptual distinction between a "bribe"
and an "extortion payment." This distinction might be drawn in two
ways. First, bribes are usually initiated by the payor, whereas extortion
payments are initiated by the payee. But many bribes may first be
suggested by the payee. Moreover, this distinction turns on facts that
are easily manipulated to gain favorable tax treatment, and it will
typically be difficult for the Commissioner to refute a taxpayer's factual
contentions.
A second way in which to distinguish bribes and extortion payments
is that a bribe is a payment made to ensure that the payor will receive
or retain something that would ordinarily not be forthcoming to him
or ordinarily retained by him, whereas extortion payments are made to
secure or retain something that is ordinarily forthcoming to the payor
or ordinarily retained by him. 9 This difference between a bribe and
an extortion payment should hold true regardless of who first suggested
or initiated a payment.
To illustrate this distinction, consider the payments made in Reliable
Milk.90 The taxpayer made payments to racketeers for their promise not
to beat up its dealers or burn its trucks. These were extortion pay-
ments because the taxpayer would ordinarily not have had its dealers
beat up or trucks burned. Similarly, in Bonney9" the taxpayer made
payments to his putative wife to induce her to stop making damaging
statements. Even though the taxpayer in Bonney may well have been
the first to suggest the quid pro quo of money for silence, the transac-
89. The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs made the same
distinction regarding possible criminal sanctions for corrupt overseas payments. S. REP.
No. 95-114, supra note 3, at 11. For a discussion of extortion payments under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, see note 3 supra.
90. Reliable Milk & Cream Co., 7 B.T.A.M. (P-H) J 38,290 (1938).
91. Bonney v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 237 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 906 (1957).
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tion involved an extortion payment and not a bribe because the tax-
payer would ordinarily have been free from his putative wife's harass-
ment.
9 2
Applying this distinction to Octopus's possible bribe, suppose the
lowest bidder on a contract with Homos ordinarily wins the contract.
If Octopus was not the lowest bidder and makes a payment to an
Homosian official to win the contract, then the payment is a bribe. If
instead Octopus is the lowest bidder and makes a payment to an
Homosian official to ensure that it will win the contract, then the
payment is an extortion payment.
This distinction makes most sense if the Homosian official went to
Octopus before the contract was awarded and threatened to see to it
that Octopus was not awarded the contract even though it was the
lowest bidder. Suppose, however, there was no communication between
Octopus and the Homosian official before the payment, that is, that
there was no threat, express or implied, that the lowest bidder would
not win the contract. Is the payment still an extortion payment and
arguably deductible? Or, even if it is not an extortion payment, could
one argue that it is not a bribe and thus, regardless of whatever other
label one might attach to it, if it was ordinary and necessary for the
taxpayer's business, then it should be deductible? Permitting such de-
ductions would comport with the strong policy favoring the taxation
of only net income, but it would also support and encourage ethically
questionable business conduct. Payments intended to influence govern-
mental decisionmaking are disfavored regardless of their actual effect,9 3
because the mere fact that a bribe is paid has a tendency to corrupt (if
for no other reason than that it may encourage extortion of further
payments). Thus a deduction should be allowed only if the payment is
based on a threat that the result predictable under the usual decision-
making process would not be reached unless the payments were made,'.4
or if the circumstances surrounding the payment make reasonable the
payor's fear that such a result would not be reached. 95
Nondeductible bribes and deductible extortion payments might also
92. Where do kickbacks fit in the conceptual dichotomy? The terms "kickbacks" and
"rebate" really describe the form of a payment. The distinction between a bribe and an
extortion payment is one that is based on the substance of the payment. A kickback, there-
fore, could in substance be either a bribe or an extortion payment. Kickbacks that are
bribes, then, ought not to be deductible and those that are extortion payments ought to
be deductible.
93. See United States v. Barash, 412 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 832 (1969).
94. Cf. United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 833 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1058 (1972) (decided under antiextortion law, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970)).
95. Cf. United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
969 (1974) (decided under antiextortion law, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970)).
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be distinguished by their size. The size of Octopus's $100,000 payment
to the agent suggests that it was not made to obtain a service or result
that would ordinarily be forthcoming from the government. By con-
trast, the size of the $200 payment to the harbormaster suggests that it
was nothing more than a "grease payment" to facilitate that which
should ordinarily be forthcoming to the payor.96
But the size of the payment has significance other than as an indicator
of its nature. The policies that support nondeductibility for some
foreign payments may vary in strength with the size of such payments.
The strongest policy behind section 162(c) is the discouragement of
morally improper business behavior. As we noted earlier, the moral
reprehensibility of a payment is related to its tendency to corrupt, and
the tendency of a payment to corrupt is related to its size.
Foreign policy considerations also support a distinction based on
the size of a payment. The extent to which a payment may interfere
with the proper conduct of a foreign government or lead to embar-
rassing publicity may well depend on the size of the payment. When
millions of dollars find their way into the pockets of government of-
ficials or the coffers of a major political party, the potential for
diplomatic havoc is significantly greater than when small payments are
made, for example, to facilitate customs clearances.
Finally, larger payments generate greater unfairness in competition
and potentially more acute deviation from governmental investment
priorities. Discouraging small payments would also put American
companies at a competitive disadvantage compared to multinational
companies not subject to American tax laws. The same would be
true, of course, for the discouragement of large foreign payments,
but there the moral and foreign policy considerations become more
important, and these considerations weigh heavily against deductions
for large payments.
There is, of course, a factual issue in distinguishing between non-
deductible bribes and deductible extortion payments. For example,
when Octopus executives paid the harbormaster $200 to expedite un-
loading their cargo, they had already waited past the average waiting
time of sixty days. If they would ordinarily have had their ship un-
loaded within sixty days, then their payment would look like an extor-
tion payment. But the problem here is determining how Octopus would
ordinarily have been treated. In many parts of the world, establishing
just what would ordinarily be forthcoming will be nearly impossible.
96. The term "grease payments" is used by, inter alia, the Senate and House reports on
prohibiting bribes of foreign governments. S. REP. No. 95-114, supra note 3, at 10; H.R.
RrP. No. 95-640, supra note 3, at 8.
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Similarly, it is difficult to judge the effect of the amount of a pay-
ment on its deductibility. If the impact of a particular amount is due
to its reprehensibility or potential embarrassment to the United States,
then a fixed dollar guideline for deductibility would not be sensible.
The reprehensibility of a payment is relative to its object. For example,
most people would probably agree that it is less reprehensible to give a
headwaiter $20 to get a better table than to give a teacher $20 to boost
a child's grade. Similarly, the potential of a payment to embarrass the
United States varies from country to country with the cost of living and
differences in what is morally acceptable.
In light of these considerations, payments of like amounts should be
treated differently depending on whether they are more accurately
classified as bribes or extortion payments. The alternative would be a
presumption that all payments below a certain amount are deductible.
Such an approach would be less costly from an administrative stand-
point and would recognize that many small payments are not as dan-
gerous as large payments of the same type. But it could also result
in deductibility for small bribes (some of which could have a large
effect on decisionmaking), in encouraging officials to demand bribes
or other payments just below the cutoff line, and in restructuring
otherwise unitary payments into series of payments, each of which is
below the cutoff line. Given the current fabric of section 162(c) and
its apparent policy objectives, a payment-by-payment approach is
preferable.97
IV. The Future of Section 162(c)
Section 162(c)(1) suffers from vagueness. An especially acute uncer-
tainty concerns the level of intent necessary under the hypothetical
illegality test, an uncertainty exacerbated because the regulations, in
97. The Securities and Exchange Commission, in an analogous situation, has not set a
minimum cutoff level for "facilitating payments" (that is, payments made "to persuade
low-level governmental officials to perform functions or services which they are obliged
to perform as part of their governmental responsibilities, but which they may refuse or
delay unless compensated," SEC Report, supra note 1, at 26-27) in determining whether
payments are "material." Some such payments have been found to be material if they are
large in amount either individually or in the aggregate, or if there exists other corporate
management misbehavior in connection with those payments or with their accounting or
reporting. Id. at 27.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, apparently
exempts "grease payments" on three grounds-lack of corrupt motive, nature of the
recipient's employment, and failure to involve assistance in "obtaining or retaining busi-
ness for or with, or directing business to, any person." See note 3 supra. The first ground
is similar to that which we propose. For difficulties associated with the second and
third, see id.
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what is probably an invalid extension of the Code, purport to apply
an objective, after-the-fact test devoid of any requirement of intent.
Section 162(c)(1) also suffers from its embodiment of several odd and
unsupportable distinctions between, for example, payments illegal
under United States law and those illegal under foreign law, and
between hypothetically illegal payments made to an official or em-
ployee of a foreign government and those made to an agency or in-
strumentality of that government.
Section 162(c), however, need not remain in its current form, with
all of its attendant difficulties. One of Congress's major concerns in
enacting section 162(c) was its view that foreign bribes are morally
wrong and ought to be discouraged. Foreign bribes were not then un-
lawful, and the Internal Revenue Code was used to encourage morality.
Section 162(c) thus filled a vacuum in the criminal laws. But since the
enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the need to use the
tax laws to encourage morality is not as acute. Since certain foreign
bribes are now unlawful, Congress should amend section 162(c) to
eliminate the hypothetical illegality test.98 That is, Congress should
reshape section 162(c) to preclude deductions of payments-whether
domestic or foreign-that are unlawful under United States law or
generally enforced state laws. Other payments would be deductible if
they are "ordinary and necessary." 99
Such a change would obviate or at least reduce many of the practical
and policy problems now caused by section 162(c). First, the difficulties
of imputing intent under the hypothetical illegality test would be
avoided altogether. Second, uncertainty about deductibility would be
reduced, although it would not be eliminated. There may not be
many prosecutions under the new Act, particularly in cases that would
provide guidance for tax purposes. Witnesses and documents will
sometimes be beyond the reach of judicial process. Foreign countries
-especially those in which bribery or extortion is rampant-may not
cooperate because of national sovereignty, internal political consid-
erations, or the fact that the officials from whom cooperation is sought
may be receiving payments subject to investigation by United States
authorities. Not only may prosecutors be hamstrung,100 but also the
ability of some defendants to defend themselves may be so constrained
as to constitute a denial of due process.' 0 ' If there are only a few
98. See pp. 1100-02 supra.
99. See note 23 supra.
100. See H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supra note 3, at 20 (minority views).
101. See Letter from Secretary of Commerce Richardson to Senator Proxmire, at 23,
June 11, 1976 (on file with Yale Law Journal).
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prosecutions of the most egregious cases, the application of the Act
will be uncertain. Thus significant uncertainty will probably remain
a part of the tax laws in this area whether or not section 162(c) is
amended. But the uncertainty will be less than it is now if section
162(c) is amended as suggested, because the Act (and probably the
cases that will be prosecuted under it) provides a clearer definition
of intent and a better basis for distinguishing between nondeductible
bribes and deductible "grease" or extortion payments than do the
present section 162(c) and its regulations.
A third benefit to be gained from amending section 162(c) as sug-
gested is that its operation would be based primarily on a clear and
updated statement of United States policy-the Act. The Act was based
on extensive hearings and analyses directed at determining exactly how
far the United States should proscribe questionable foreign payments.
Factors such as the realities of international business, jurisdiction, en-
forcement, and diplomacy were explicitly considered. 10 2 The role or
weight of these and other factors may be different in tax law than in
criminal law, but any differences are not large.
A fourth benefit of amending section 162(c) as suggested is that more
questionable payments that are "ordinary and necessary" would be
deductible than is now the case, due to the narrowness of the Act. This
is consistent with the function of the income tax of taxing only net
income. 10 3 The same narrowness, on the other hand, would reduce the
impact of section 162(c) in discouraging immoral behavior if that con-
cept is interpreted without reference to the Act. Discouraging im-
morality, however, is not the primary function of the tax system, and it
conflicts in this instance with the fundamental goal of taxing net in-
come. 0 4 Especially since the suggested amendment would continue to
discourage precisely the behavior that Congress has made criminal,
this consideration of discouraging immorality does not weigh strongly
against the suggested amendment.
Similarly, the greater deductibility of questionable foreign payments
that would result from the suggested amendment would reduce United
States tax revenues. 1 5 The exact amount by which revenues would
decrease is uncertain, but it is most unlikely that the reduction could
102. E.g., H. CONF. REP. No. 95-831, supra note 3, at 14; H.R. REP. No. 95-640, supra
note 3, at 8.
103. E.g., Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966).
104. S. REP. No. 85-1983, supra note 12, at 125. See also STAFF OF THE JOINT Co,11-
IrIrEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, STUDY ON INCOME 'TAX TREATMENT OF TREBLE
DAMAGE PAYMENTS UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS 11-12 (Nov. 1, 1965).
105. Revenue receipts under I.R.C. §§ 952(a), 964(a), and 995(b)(1)(D) would also be
affected, since they are dependent on the definition of § 162(c) payments.
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be large enough to affect significantly the desirability of the suggested
amendment to section 162(c).
On balance, then, section 162(c) should be amended to deny de-
ductibility only to payments that are actually unlawful. Such an amend-
ment would cure some problems of the current section 162(c) and
alleviate others, at only a small cost.
Many of the shortcomings that an amended section 162(c) would
have are due to shortcomings of the criminal law and, perhaps, to the
inability of the United States and other nations to agree to appropriate
treaties. The fact that the criminal laws are poorly designed or in-
adequate to deal with the immorality of foreign bribes does not justify
badly written tax laws. The result has been and will continue to be
a failure either to encourage morality in international business or
to achieve a fair and workable tax system.
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